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Saving the California Homeowner Bill of
Rights from Federal Banking
Preemption
By JEREMY F. KOO*
Introduction
“WHY WOULD A BANK FORECLOSE when it was working with
her on a short sale? . . . She assumed the bank’s foreclosure depart-
ment would know what its short sale department was doing. That’s
where she went wrong . . . .”1 Dual tracking occurs when a bank fore-
closes on a loan while an alternative to avoid it is pending2 and is one
of several foreclosure abuses addressed by the California Homeowner
Bill of Rights.3 This law, which became effective January 1, 2013,4 is
under attack by federally chartered banks asserting that federal bank-
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could write this Comment.  I would also like to express my gratitude to my parents, Paul
Koo and Eleanor Lannen, for their love and wisdom given to me throughout law school
and life.  Finally, I would like to acknowledge the editorial staff of the University of San
Francisco Law Review for their work in preparing this piece for publication.
1. Hudson Sangree, A Test for New State Homeowner Law, SACRAMENTO BEE (June 21,
2013, 12:00 AM), http://www.sacbee.com/2013/06/21/5513560/a-test-for-new-state-
homeowner.html.
2. See JOSEPH A. SMITH, JR., ONGOING IMPLEMENTATION: A REPORT FROM THE MONITOR
OF THE NATIONAL MORTGAGE SETTLEMENT 7 (2013) [hereinafter NMS MONITOR REPORT],
available at https://www.mortgageoversight.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/02/Ongoing-
Implementation.pdf.
3. See A.B. 278, ch. 86, 2012 Cal. Legis. Serv. 2300–18 (West) (codified at CAL. CIV.
CODE §§ 2920.5, 2923.4–.7, 2924, 2924.9–.12, 2924.15, 2924.17–.20); S.B. 900, ch. 87, 2012
Cal. Legis. Serv. 2318–36 (West) (codified at CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 2920.5, 2923.4–.7, 2924,
2924.9–.12, 2924.15, 2924.17–.20); Press Release, Cal. Att’y Gen., California Homeowner
Bill of Rights Signed into Law (July 11, 2012), available at http://oag.ca.gov/news/press-
releases/california-homeowner-bill-rights-signed-law (“The Homeowner Bill of Rights con-
sists of a series of related bills, including two identical bills that were passed on July 2, by
the state Senate and Assembly AB 278 . . . and SB 900 . . . .”).
4. See A.B. 278; S.B. 900.
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ing law preempts these state law protections.5 Courts have predomi-
nately agreed with the banks, but only because courts and
homeowners’ counsel6 have missed subtle but important changes in
federal banking preemption statutes and case law.
From 2005 to 2007, during the housing boom leading up to the
subprime mortgage crisis, twelve federal thrifts and national banks ac-
counted for about 40% of the subprime loans made by all subprime
lenders.7 As the housing market began to collapse between 2006 and
2008, “loans made by federal thrifts had the highest delinquency rate,
while loans made by national banks had the second highest delin-
quency rate. In contrast, loans made by state-chartered thrifts and
state-chartered banks . . . had substantially lower delinquency
rates . . . .”8 Federal banking regulators placed some of the largest
thrifts into receivership and sold them to national banks.9
In February 2012, a coalition of forty-nine state attorneys general
and the federal government announced a national settlement with the
country’s five largest mortgage servicers10 creating servicing standards
to curb practices that have caused avoidable foreclosures.11 While
these servicers have been required to be in full compliance with these
5. See, e.g., Marquez v. Wells Fargo Bank, No. C 13–2819 PJH, 2013 WL 5141689, at
*3 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 13, 2013) (“Principally, Wells Fargo asserts that all causes of action
[including alleged violations of the recently enacted California Homeowner Bill of Rights]
asserted in the complaint are preempted by the Homeowners Loan Act . . . .”); Pratap v.
Wells Fargo Bank, No. C 12–06378 MEJ, 2013 WL 5487474, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 1, 2013)
(“Defendants contend that Plaintiffs’ claims against Wells Fargo—all arising under Califor-
nia law [including CAL. CIV. CODE 2923.5]—are statutorily preempted under the federal
Home Owners Loan Act . . . .”).
6. See cases cited infra note 194 and accompanying text.
7. Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., The Dodd-Frank Act’s Expansion of State Authority to Protect
Consumers of Financial Services, 36 J. CORP. L. 893, 918 (2011).
8. Id. at 919.
9. See, e.g., id. at 917; WILLIAM RUBERRY, OFFICE OF THRIFT SUPERVISION, OTS FACT
SHEET ON WASHINGTON MUTUAL BANK 2–3 (2008), available at http://files.ots.treas.gov/
730021.pdf (stating that Washington Mutual was the largest savings and loan association in
the United States before being placed in receivership and later acquired by JPMorgan
Chase).
10. Joint State-Federal Mortgage Servicing Settlement FAQ, NATIONAL MORTGAGE SETTLE-
MENT [hereinafter Settlement FAQ], http://www.nationalmortgagesettlement.com/faq (last
visited July 13, 2013) (“The settlement will cost the nation’s five largest mortgage services,
which control about 60 percent of the mortgage servicing market, an estimated $25 to $32
billion.”).
11. About the Settlement, NATIONAL MORTGAGE SETTLEMENT, http://www.nationalmort-
gagesettlement.com/about (last visited Oct. 21, 2013) (describing the settlements with
Ally/GMAC, Bank of America, Citi, JPMorgan Chase, and Wells Fargo); see generally Con-
sent Judgment at Ex. A 16–32, United States v. Bank of Am. Corp., No. 12-0361 (D.D.C.
Apr. 4, 2012) [hereinafter Consent Judgment], available at https://d9klfgibkcquc.cloud-
front.net/Consent_Judgment_BoA-4-11-12.pdf.
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standards since October 2, 2012,12 borrower complaints about the
loan modification process and notice issues continue.13 Even if these
banks were to come into perfect compliance, settlement enforcement
expires October 4, 2015, thereby depriving the courts of jurisdiction
to order these servicers to address foreclosure abuses.14 Additionally,
the settlement is not enforceable as to servicers not party to the
settlement.15
To extend many of the settlement’s terms to larger mortgage ser-
vicers16 operating in California, the California Legislature enacted
A.B. 278,17 the central legislation in a series of acts constituting the
California Homeowner Bill of Rights18 which became effective January
1, 2013.19 One part of A.B. 278 makes permanent Civil Code section
2923.5, which requires servicers to contact delinquent borrowers re-
garding alternatives to foreclosure before recording a Notice of De-
fault,20 the first step in California’s non-judicial foreclosure scheme.21
Borrowers may request an injunctive remedy for section 2923.5 viola-
tions by enjoining servicers from proceeding with a foreclosure sale
until the servicer complied.22 When facing foreclosure, borrowers
12. NMS MONITOR REPORT, supra note 4, at 5. R
13. Id. at 6–7.
14. See Consent Judgment, supra note 8, at E-16 (“This Consent Judgment . . . shall
retain full force and effect three and one-half years from the date it is entered . . . .”). The
Consent Judgment was entered into on April 4, 2012. Id.
15. See Settlement FAQ, supra note 7 (“This settlement involves the nation’s five largest
mortgage servicers.”).
16. See A.B. 278, ch. 86, §§ 6, 7, 9, 12–14, 16, 2012 Cal. Legis. Serv. 2300, 2305–09,
2311–14 (West) (codified at CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 2323.55, 2923.6, 2923.7, 2924.9–.11, and
2924.12, respectively) (exempting servicers annually foreclosing on 175 or fewer homes
from many of the requirements, such as the statutory loan modification review, denial, and
appeal process).
17. A.B. 278; S.B. 900, ch. 87, 2012 Cal. Legis. Serv. 2318–36 (West) (codified at CAL.
CIV. CODE §§ 2920.5, 2923.4–.7, 2924, 2924.9–.12, 2924.15, 2924.17–.20) (containing the
exact text of A.B. 278).
18. See California Homeowner Bill of Rights, OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL, http://
www.oag.ca.gov/hbor (last visited Oct. 21, 2013).
19. A.B. 278.
20. Id. §§ 4–6 (extending Cal. Civ. Code § 2923.5 to January 1, 2018, for servicers
foreclosing on fewer than 175 homes; replacing § 2923.5 on January 1, 2018, with no expi-
ration date; and creating § 2923.55 with a similar notice requirement for other servicers
expiring January 1, 2018). See generally Cal. Civ. Code § 2923.5(j) (West 2012) (pre-A.B. 278
version expiring January 1, 2013).
21. See Cal. Civ. Code § 2924(a)(1)–(3) (West 2012 & Supp. 2013) (recording notice
of default precedes notice of sale).
22. See e.g., Mabry v. Superior Court, 110 Cal. Rptr. 3d 201, 207–11, 218–19, 222 (Cal.
Ct. App. 2010) (concluding that section 2923.5 is enforceable by private right of action but
only to postpone a foreclosure sale until compliance).
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often make this request in conjunction with other causes of action
alleging predatory lending and other wrongful foreclosure practices.23
Some of the largest mortgage servicers, however, claim that many
of their loans are not subject to the section 2923.5 requirements be-
cause the loans were originated by federal savings banks or savings
associations (collectively “thrifts”).24 Before the Dodd-Frank Wall
Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act25 (“Dodd-Frank”) took
effect in 2010, thrifts enjoyed express statutory field preemption of
state laws under the Home Owners’ Loan Act (“HOLA”).26 At the
same time, national banks benefited from the narrower implied pre-
emption of state laws that only conflict with national banking pow-
ers.27 Once the Dodd-Frank preemption rule came into effect on July
23. See e.g., Nguyen v. Wells Fargo Bank, 749 F. Supp. 2d 1022, 1024 (N.D. Cal. 2010)
(“[A]lleging wrongful foreclosure, violation of . . . [sections] 2923.5 and 2924, fraudulent
misrepresentation, . . . and injunctive relief,” and other claims); Wienke v. Indymac Bank,
No. CV 10–4082 NJV, 2011 WL 871749, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 14, 2011) (alleging violation
of section 2923.5, the federal Truth in Lending Act (“TILA”), and other claims); Wornum
v. Aurora Loan Servs., Inc., No. C–11–02189 JCS, 2011 WL 3516055, at *2–3 (N.D. Cal.
Aug. 11, 2011) (alleging violation of section 2923.5, TILA, the federal Real Estate Settle-
ment Procedures Act, and other claims).
24. E.g., Nguyen, 749 F. Supp. 2d at 1031 (“Wells Fargo contends that all of Plaintiff’s
claims are completely preempted . . . because [the originator of the loan] . . . was a feder-
ally chartered savings bank regulated by the Office of Thrift Supervision under the Home
Owners Loan Act . . . at the time the loan was made.”); Pratap v. Wells Fargo Bank, No. C
12–06378 MEJ, 2013 WL 5487474, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 1, 2013) (“Because Plaintiffs’ loans
originated with World Savings, a federal savings association, and Wells Fargo is the succes-
sor-in-interest to World Savings with respect to Plaintiffs’ loans, Wells Fargo argues that
HOLA [preemption] applies.”); Marquez v. Wells Fargo Bank, No. C 13–2819 PJH, 2013
WL 5141689, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 13, 2013) (“[T]his court has previously ruled that
where a plaintiff’s loan originated with World Savings, which was a federal savings bank,
claims subsequently asserted against Wells Fargo were subject to HOLA.”).
25. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-
203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010).
26. 12 U.S.C. §§ 1463(a), 1464(a) (2006) (authorizing the Director of the Office of
Thrift Supervision to issue regulations that allow thrifts to exercise their banking powers)
(current version at 12 U.S.C. §§ 1463(a), 1464(a) (2012)); 12 C.F.R. § 560.2(a) (2013)
(“OTS hereby occupies the entire field of lending regulation for federal savings
associations.”).
27. Compare 12 U.S.C. §§ 1463(a), 1464(a) (authorizing the Office of Thrift Supervi-
sion to issue regulations occupying the field of lending and preempting state law) with
Barnett Bank of Marion Cnty., v. Nelson, 517 U.S. 25, 31 (1996) (finding that no express
statute relating to preemption of state laws for benefit of national banks existed at that
time and inquiring whether the general powers of national banks were in “irreconcilable
conflict” with state statute). See also, e.g., OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY,
INTERPRETIVE LETTER NO. 1080, (2007), available at http://www.occ.gov/static/interpreta-
tions-and-precedents/may07/int1080.pdf (concluding that, because a national bank had
federal statutory authority to offer trust and fiduciary services in the state of Missouri, a
Missouri statute imposing requirements before the bank could provide those services was
in conflict with the NBA).
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21, 2011, HOLA field preemption should have expired along with the
Office of Thrift Supervision (“OTS”),28 and all federally chartered
banks29 should only benefit from the more permissive conflict
preemption.
California federal district courts, however, continue to hold that
HOLA field preemption preempts section 2923.5.30 Many have ex-
tended HOLA field preemption for state law violations solely because
the loan originator was a thrift and the loan was originated before
Dodd-Frank changed the preemption rule.31 Courts are extending
field preemption even to successor servicers, which are not thrifts.32
This Comment argues that courts that continue field preemption for
any entity on this basis are in error. If this error is not reversed, loans
originated by thrifts before Dodd-Frank came into effect will be en-
tirely exempt from A.B. 278. Courts should instead identify when and
which entity was responsible for each state law claim to determine
which preemption standard, if any, applies.
Part I will explain federal preemption standards for federally
chartered banks both as they exist today and as they existed prior to
Dodd-Frank’s implementation. Part II will explain how A.B. 278 envi-
sions the ideal non-judicial foreclosure process and describes the pen-
alties for non-compliance. Part III will discuss where the case law’s
evolution on this question has gone astray and how some courts have
recognized this error despite the foreclosure prevention bar’s failure
to dispute the error. Part III additionally proposes that courts should
determine whether pre-Dodd-Frank HOLA field preemption applies
based on which entity holds the loan when the cause of action arises
as opposed to which type of entity originated the loan. Part IV will
then discuss why, contrary to what some federal district courts are con-
cluding, today’s federal preemption standard should not preempt
A.B. 278.
28. See infra Part III.
29. Federally chartered banks are either national banks regulated under the National
Bank Act, or thrifts regulated under HOLA. See infra notes 34–35 and accompanying text.
30. E.g., DeLeon v. Wells Fargo Bank, 729 F. Supp. 2d 1119, 1127 (N.D. Cal. 2010)
(“[Section] 2923.5 affects the servicing of mortgages, that implicates HOLA’s express pre-
emption of state laws regulating the ‘processing’ and ‘servicing’ [of] mortgages.”) (foot-
note omitted).
31. E.g., Guerrero v. Wells Fargo Bank, No. CV 10–5095–VBF(AJWx), 2010 WL
8971769, at *3 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 14, 2010) (“Where a national association, such as Defen-
dant, acquires the loan of a federal savings bank, it is proper to apply preemption under
HOLA.”).
32. E.g., id.
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I. Federal Preemption Regulations: The Home Owners’ Loan
Act and the National Bank Act
Banks in the United States are regulated under what’s called the
“dual-banking” system, where banks choose either a state or a federal
entity as their primary regulator.33 In California, banks and thrifts can
be divided into three categories for purposes of this Comment: (1)
national banks primarily regulated under the National Bank Act
(“NBA”),34 (2) federal thrifts primarily regulated under HOLA,35 and
(3) state banks and savings associations primarily regulated under the
state’s Financial Institutions Law.36
The federally chartered entities—national banks and thrifts—
benefit from the preemption of state laws that affect their banking
powers.37 Such entities use federal preemption as a defense to state
laws like A.B. 278.
A. Preemption Before Dodd-Frank
Before Dodd-Frank, the preemption analysis for national banks
and thrifts differed significantly. The Office of the Comptroller of
Currency (“OCC”) regulated national banks. National banks were, for
the most part, subject to the same preemption analysis that applies
today.38 Thrifts, however, were regulated by the Office of Thrift Super-
vision (“OTS”),39 which elected to occupy “the entire field of lending
regulation for federal savings associations.”40 As illustrative examples,
33. See The Dual Banking System, Fed. Banking L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 531 (2013).
34. See 12 U.S.C. § 24 (2012) (describing the powers of national banks); Aguayo v.
U.S. Bank (Aguayo II), 653 F.3d 912, 919 (9th Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 106 (2012)
(“[NBA is] the ultimate statutory authority for national banks . . . .”).
35. 12 U.S.C. §§ 1461–1470 (2012); see also Aguayo II, 653 F.3d at 921 (“[Federal thrifts
are] under the authority of the Home Owners’ Loan Act . . . .”).
36. CAL. FIN. CODE §§ 1000–1910, (West 2013), §§ 5000–9001 (West 1999 & Supp.
2013) (relating to California banks and California thrifts, respectively).
37. See 10 AM. JUR. 2D Banks and Financial Institutions § 105 (2013) (providing that
National banks remain generally subject to state laws that do not conflict with the letter or
the general purposes of the National Bank Act); id. § 68 (describing the history of thrift
preemption, including changes from the Dodd-Frank Act).
38. See Raymond Nutter & Katie Wechsler, Dodd-Frank Act and National Bank Preemp-
tion: Much Ado About Nothing, 7 VA. L. & BUS. REV. 301, 337 (2012) (“[Dodd-Frank] basically
leaves intact the traditional rules for determining if a state law is preempted [by the
NBA].”).
39. See NANCY SAINT-PAUL, 2 WEST’S FED. ADMIN. PRAC. § 1849 (4th ed. 2012) (“Dodd-
Frank . . . transferred the functions of the Office of Thrift Supervision to the Office of the
Comptroller of the Currency, which will now supervise federal thrifts . . . .”).
40. 12 C.F.R. § 560.2 (2011); see also 12 U.S.C. § 1463(a)(2) (2006) (“The Director [of
the Office of Thrift Supervision] may issue such regulations as the Director determines to
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OTS preempted “without limitation, state laws purporting to impose
requirements regarding . . . [p]rocessing, origination, servicing, sale
or purchase of, or investment or participation in, mortgages.”41 How-
ever, state laws regarding contract and commercial law, real property
law, and tort law that “only incidentally affect the lending operations
of Federal savings associations or are otherwise consistent with the
purposes of [field occupation]” were not preempted.42
B. Current Law on Preemption
There is now one statutory standard for national banks and for
thrifts under Dodd-Frank.43 State laws are preempted if they have a
discriminatory effect on national banks compared to those chartered
by that state,44 or “in accordance with the legal standard for preemp-
tion . . . in Barnett Bank.”45
The Office of Thrift Supervision was abolished and the new uni-
fied conflict preemption standard for national banks and thrifts took
effect on July 21, 2011.46 Both national banks and thrifts are now regu-
lated by the OCC.47 Both types of entities may make real estate loans48
“without regard to state law limitations concerning . . . [p]rocessing,
origination, servicing, sale or purchase of, or investment or participa-
be appropriate to carry out the responsibilities of the Director or the Office [of Thrift
Supervision].”).
41. 12 C.F.R. § 560.2(b).
42. Id. § 560.2(c).
43. See 12 U.S.C. §25b (2012) (“State law preemption standards for national banks
and subsidiaries clarified.”); Id. § 1465 (“Any determination [on preemption of state law by
a federal statute governing thrifts] shall be made in accordance with the laws and legal
standards applicable to national banks regarding the preemption of State law.”); 12 C.F.R.
§ 7.4010 (2012) (implementing 12 U.S.C. § 25b); id. § 160.2 (implementing 12 U.S.C.
§ 1465).
44. 12 U.S.C. § 25b(b)(1)(A).
45. Id. § 25b(b)(1)(B) (referring to Barnett Bank, which found preemption where the
State consumer financial law prevents or significantly interferes with the national bank’s
exercise of its powers).
46. Office of Thrift Supervision Integration; Dodd-Frank Act Implementation, 76 Fed.
Reg. 43549–51 (July 21, 2011) (codified at 12 C.F.R. pts. 7.4010 and 34.2) (stating that the
transfer of OTS powers under Dodd-Frank is July 21, 2011, and that provisions that affect
the scope of preemption are “effective as of the transfer date”).
47. 12 U.S.C. §§ 1463(c), 1464(i)(5)(A), 1464(t)(9)(A)–(C), 1464(t)(10)(A).
48. 12 U.S.C. §§ 371(a), 1464(c)(1)(B) (“[A] [f]ederal savings association may invest
in, sell, or otherwise deal in . . . [l]oans on the security of liens upon residential real
property.”); 12 C.F.R. § 34.3 (“A national bank may make, arrange, purchase, or sell loans
or extensions of credit, or interests therein, that are secured by liens on, or interests in,
real estate . . . .”). See also 12 U.S.C. § 24 (“[A] national banking association . . . shall have
power . . . [t]o exercise . . . all such incidental powers as shall be necessary to carry on the
business of banking . . . .”).
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tion in, mortgages.”49 However, state laws on the subject of contracts,
torts, rights to collect debts, and the acquisition and transfer of real
property are not inconsistent with the real estate lending powers of
national banks to the extent consistent with Barnett Bank.50 Yet, in im-
plementing Dodd-Frank, the OCC rejected Barnett Bank’s explicit
“prevent or significantly interfere with” standard,51 which was not a
“new, stand-alone standard” but rather “conflict preemption, as sup-
ported by the reasoning of [Barnett Bank], which includes, but is not
bounded by, the ‘prevent or significantly interfere’ formulation.”52 A
summary of the resulting changes is in Table 1.
Table 1 – Comparison of Regulators and Preemption Before and
After Dodd-Frank Adoption on July 21, 2011
Before July 21, 2011 On or After July 21, 2011
Bank Type Primary Primary Preemption Primary Preemption
Regulatory Regulator Level Regulator Level
Law
National National OCC Conflict and OCC Conflict and
Banks Bank Act Barnett Bank Barnett Bank
(“NBA”)
Federal Home OTS Occupied OCC Conflict and
Thrifts Owners’ the Field Barnett Bank
Loan Act
(“HOLA”)
State Banks State State bank N/A State bank N/A
and Savings financial regulator regulator
Associations institutions
law
II. A.B. 278 Requires Servicers to Disclose Alternatives to
Foreclosure
A.B. 278 was enacted to prevent the damage foreclosures cause to
local economies by changing the foreclosure process to ensure bor-
rowers have an opportunity to be informed of the possibility of alter-
49. 12 C.F.R. § 34.4(a)(10); see also id. § 7.4010 (“Federal savings associations . . . shall
be subject to the same laws and legal standards, including regulations of the OCC, as are
applicable to national banks and their subsidiaries, regarding the preemption of state
law.”).
50. Barnett Bank of Marion Cnty. v. Nelson, 517 U.S. 25, 33 (1996) (“States [have] the
power to regulate national banks, where . . . doing so does not prevent or significantly
interfere with [a] national bank’s exercise of its powers.”); 12 C.F.R. § 34.4(b).
51. Dodd-Frank Act Implementation, 76 Fed. Reg. at 43555 (July 21, 2011).
52. Id.
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natives to foreclosure.53 Part II.A discusses how A.B. 278 accomplishes
this by adding steps to California’s non-judicial foreclosure scheme.
Part II.B discusses the penalties for failure to comply.
A. The Envisioned California Non-Judicial Foreclosure Process
Borrowers may be unaware that many servicers participate in state
and federal foreclosure prevention programs.54 A.B. 278 mandates a
process in which the servicer reaches out and makes a borrower aware
of these options as the first step in the foreclosure process, even
before recording any notices with a county recorder.55 The steps as
outlined in this Part assume a borrower defaults and remains in de-
fault through the entire foreclosure process, except where the context
requires otherwise.
Prior to A.B. 278, a non-judicial foreclosure in California began
when the servicer recorded a notice of default with the county re-
corder and served the homeowner with that notice.56 Three months
later, the servicer could record a Notice of Sale informing the bor-
rower of the time and date for the foreclosure auction.57 Finally, at
least twenty days after that, the servicer was allowed to complete the
trustee’s sale.58
Now, A.B. 278 requires further steps from large servicers prior to
recording a Notice of Default.59 First, the servicer must inform the
53. A.B. 278, ch. 86, § 1(b), 2012 Cal. Legis. Serv. 2300, 2302 (West) (enacting A.B.
278 to “mitigate the negative effects on the state and local economies and the housing
market that are the result of continued foreclosures by modifying the foreclosure process
to ensure that borrowers who may qualify for a foreclosure alternative are considered for,
and have a meaningful opportunity to obtain, available loss mitigation options”).
54. See generally Programs, KEEP YOUR HOME CALIFORNIA, http://www.keepyourhome
california.org/programs (last visited Aug. 17, 2013) (describing state foreclosure preven-
tion programs); Dep’ts of the Treasury & Hous. and Urban Dev., Explore Programs, MAKING
HOME AFFORDABLE, http://www.makinghomeaffordable.gov/programs/Pages/default.
aspx (last updated May 31, 2012, 1:05 PM) (describing federal foreclosure prevention
programs).
55. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 2923.55(a) (West Supp. 2013) (preventing Notice of Default
filings until contact requirements are satisfied).
56. CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 2924(a)(1), 2924b(b)(1), 2924b(d) (West 2012) (requiring re-
cording; notice; publication, personal service, or posting the notice of default in a conspic-
uous place on the property, respectively).
57. Id. §§ 2924(a)(3), 2924(b)(1) (requiring servicer to give notice of sale, but not
until after three months after notice of default, and requiring the time and place of sale in
the notice, respectively).
58. Id. § 2924f(b)(1) (requiring notice of sale to be given at least twenty days before
the sale will be held).
59. See CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 2923.55(g), 2923.6(i), 2923.7(g), 2924.9(b), 2924.10(c),
2924.11(i), 2924.12(j) (West Supp. 2013) (limiting most of the requirements to mortgage
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borrower in writing that he may request various pieces of information
relating to his loan.60 At least thirty days prior to recording a Notice of
Default,61 the servicer must contact the borrower by telephone or in
person,62 or in lieu of contact satisfy a standard of duly diligent at-
tempts at contact.63 If, at that time, the borrower requests a foreclo-
sure prevention alternative,64 the servicer must establish forthwith a
single point of contact65 that the borrower can contact directly.66 The
single point of contact must have the ability to perform various re-
sponsibilities such as receiving documents needed to complete the
loan modification application and informing the borrower of any defi-
ciencies in the application.67
As part of the modification application process, within five busi-
ness days of the receipt of any documentation submitted in connec-
tion with a modification application, the servicer must provide written
acknowledgement and state which additional documents are re-
quired, if any.68 If the borrower completes and submits the applica-
tion, the servicer cannot record any further notices or conduct a
trustee’s sale until the application is decided upon.69 This provision
bars dual tracking, which is processing a modification in a way that
makes the borrower believe the modification is being considered
when in fact the lender is proceeding with the foreclosure.70 When
servicers engage in dual tracking, the modification is doomed for fail-
ure from the start. When the trustee’s sale is completed, the applica-
tion is left pending.71
servicers that foreclosed on more than 175 residential real properties in the preceding
annual reporting period).
60. Id. § 2923.55(b)(1)(B)(i–iv).
61. Id. § 2923.55(a)(2) (requiring thirty days between initial contact or due diligence
satisfaction and recording notice of default).
62. Id. § 2923.55(b)(2) (requiring borrower contact).
63. Id. § 2923.55(f).
64. Id. § 2920.5 (defining “Foreclosure prevention alternative” as a “first lien loan
modification or another available loss mitigation option”).
65. Id. § 2923.7(e) (defining “single point of contact”).
66. Id. § 2923.7(a).
67. Id. § 2923.7(b).
68. See id. § 2924.10(a).
69. Id. § 2923.6(c).
70. See NMS MONITOR REPORT, supra note 4, at 7. R
71. See id.; Sangree, supra note 1 (providing an example of dual-tracking by Bank of R
America in violation of section 2923.55).
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After evaluating the application, the servicer can (1) approve the
application and offer modification or (2) reject the application.72 If
approved, so long as the borrower accepts the offer within fourteen
days,73 the lender cannot record any further notices or conduct a trus-
tee’s sale.74 If the borrower completes the steps required for the modi-
fication to become permanent, the lender must record a rescindment
of any notice of default or notice of sale.75
However, if the lender rejects the modification it must send a
written notice to the borrower identifying with specificity the reasons
for the denial.76 The lender still cannot proceed with recording fur-
ther notices until a thirty-day period to appeal the denial has
elapsed.77 If the borrower does appeal with new information, the
lender can offer a modification as if it were offered in the first place.78
If it denies the appeal, the lender may proceed with further notices or
a sale fifteen days after denial.79
Nothing in A.B. 278 requires a lender to offer a modification.80
Many large loan servicers, however, have signed on to the Home Af-
fordable Modification Program81 which requires all participating ser-
vicers “to consider all eligible mortgage loans for [loan
modification] . . . .”82
72. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 2923.6(c) (prohibiting servicer from recording additional
notices to foreclose or conducting a sale, unless it has rejected modification and borrower
right to appeal is extinguished, the borrower fails to accept modification, or the borrower
defaults on his obligations under the modification).
73. Id. § 2923.6(c)(2).
74. Id. § 2923.6(c).
75. Id. § 2924.11(d).
76. Id. § 2923.6(f).
77. Id. §§ 2923.6(d), 2923.6(e)(1) (allowing borrower thirty days to appeal with new
evidence and prohibiting servicer from recording foreclosure notice or conducting sale
until thirty-one days after the borrower was notified in writing of the denial if the borrower
does not appeal modification denial, respectively).
78. See id. § 2923.6(e)(2) (permitting servicer to record further foreclosure notices or
to proceed with sale if borrower does not accept a servicer’s offered loan modification after
appeal within fourteen days, mirroring section 2923.6(c)(2)).
79. Id. § 2923.6(c)(2).
80. CAL. CIV. CODE § 2923.4(a) (West 2012 & Supp. 2013) (“Nothing in [A.B. 278] . . .
shall be interpreted to require a particular result of [the non-judicial foreclosure
process].”).
81. See generally, e.g., Dep’ts of the Treasury & Hous. and Urban Dev., Contact Your
Mortgage Company, MAKING HOME AFFORDABLE, http://www.makinghomeaffordable.gov/
get-started/contact-mortgage/Pages/default.aspx (last updated July 12, 2013, 9:41 AM)
(listing participating servicers as including Bank of America, CitiMortgage, J.P. Morgan
Chase, and Wells Fargo).
82. DEP’TS OF THE TREASURY & HOUS. AND URBAN DEV., MAKING HOME AFFORDABLE
PROGRAM, HANDBOOK FOR SERVICERS OF NON-GSE MORTGAGES, VERSION 4.1, at 21 (2012),
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B. Penalties for Non-Compliance
A.B. 278 creates a private right of action for failure to comply
with any of its provisions.83 If the foreclosure sale has not been com-
pleted, the borrower may ask a court for injunctive relief to prevent a
material violation of the act, which shall remain in place until the ser-
vicer can show that the violation is corrected and remedied.84
If the foreclosure sale has been completed, the borrower may sue
for actual economic damages for violations not remedied before the
sale.85 If the court finds that the violation was intentional or reckless,
or resulted from willful misconduct, the court may award the greater
of treble actual damages or statutory damages of $50,000.86 The court
may also award a prevailing borrower’s attorney’s fees and costs.87 Fi-
nally, if the violating servicer is licensed by the California Department
of Business Oversight or the Department of Real Estate, a violation
shall be deemed to be a violation of that entity’s licensing law.88
III. Courts Should Use the Date a State Cause of Action
Arose to Determine Which Banking Entity is
Responsible and Which Type of Preemption to
Apply
Once the Dodd-Frank preemption rule came into effect on July
21, 2011, HOLA field preemption should have expired along with the
OTS. Despite Dodd-Frank’s passage, federal district courts in Califor-
nia continue to apply HOLA field preemption to thrifts accused of
state law violations of A.B. 278 because the loan was originated before
Dodd-Frank took effect.89 Further, they still apply HOLA field pre-
available at http://www.makinghomeaffordable.gov/for-partners/understanding-guide-
lines/Documents/mhahandbook_41.pdf.
83. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 2924.12(a)–(b).
84. Id. § 2924.12(a).
85. Id. § 2924.12(b).
86. Id.
87. Id. § 2924.12(i).
88. Id. § 2924.12(d) (“A violation of [specific provisions of A.B. 278] by a person li-
censed by the Department of Corporations, Department of Financial Institutions, or the
Department of Real Estate shall be deemed a violation of that entity’s licensing laws.”).
Effective July 1, 2013, pursuant to the Governor’s Reorganization Plan No. 2, the Depart-
ment of Corporations and the Department of Financial Institutions became the Depart-
ment of Business Oversight. A.B. 1317, Ch. 352, § 84(b)–(c), 2013 Cal. Legis. Serv. (West)
(to be codified at CAL. FIN. CODE § 321(b)–(c)).
89. See infra Part III.A.
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emption to loans that were originated by federal thrifts for entities
that are not federal thrifts.90
The legal theory that supports continuing HOLA field preemp-
tion is an accident of imprecise opinions that came out in the confu-
sion of bank mergers and changes in the law that took place between
2008 and July 21, 2011.91
Much of the California case law on HOLA field preemption con-
cerning loans serviced by national banks name Wells Fargo as the de-
fendant because of the history of mergers and seizures in the lead up
to and wake of the subprime mortgage crisis.92 Golden West Financial
and its subsidiary federal thrift, World Savings Bank, was the nation’s
second largest federal thrift by the time it was sold to Wachovia Bank
in 2006.93 World Savings engaged heavily in subprime option adjusta-
ble-rate mortgages (“Option ARMs”), which it marketed as “Pick-A-
Payment” loans.94 Borrowers could choose whether to make a fully
amortized payment, an interest only payment, or a less-than-interest
payment with the excess added to principal (so-called negative amorti-
zation).95 One major cause of the subprime mortgage crisis was that
many borrowers could only afford the negatively amortizing payment
option.96 If the borrower allows the principal balance to grow too
high, the loan will recast, meaning the borrower is forced to make a
fully-amortized payment.97 Borrowers who could barely pay the mini-
mum payment would find the increased payment impossible to
90. See infra Part III.A.2–3.
91. See infra Part III.A.
92. See generally World of Trouble, CBS NEWS (Aug. 19, 2010, 11:41 AM) [hereinafter
World of Trouble], http://www.cbsnews.com/2102-18560_162-4801309.html (providing the
transcript of a 60 Minutes story on the collapse of the World Savings subprime loan portfo-
lio, which contributed to Wachovia National Bank’s failure and subsequent sale to Wells
Fargo).
93. See id.
94. See id.
95. See id.
96. See id.
97. See WELLS FARGO & CO., ANNUAL REPORT 60 (2012) [hereinafter WELLS FARGO
ANNUAL REPORT], available at https://www.wellsfargo.com/downloads/pdf/invest_rela-
tions/2012-annual-report.pdf (describing a recast as something that would cause a Pick-a-
Pay loan borrower to lose the right to make the negatively amortizing payment specifically,
“on the earlier of the date when the loan balance reaches its principal cap [of 125% of the
original loan amount], or . . . the 10-year anniversary of the loan”).
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meet.98 Even if there is no danger of reaching the loan-to-value cap,
these loans also automatically recast after ten years.99
Wachovia could not survive the onslaught of loan failures from
the World Savings portfolio.100 When Wachovia became severely un-
dercapitalized, the FDIC brokered a sale of Wachovia to Wells Fargo,
which now has the task of winding down the enormous Option ARM
portfolio acquired from World Savings.101 For that reason, many of
the following preemption cases involve Wells Fargo as the defendant.
Part III.A discusses the cases predominately used to support the
argument that a determination of whether HOLA preempts Califor-
nia Civil Code section 2923.5—a law which has been extended by A.B.
278—depends on with whom the loan originated. Part III.B explains
how the Ninth Circuit has reversed these cases and contends that
courts should recognize that conflict preemption applies when an
NBA-regulated bank holds the note at the moment a section 2923.5 or
other A.B. 278 cause of action arises. Finally, Part III.C will compare
cases that have not made this recognition with cases that have.
A. Without Guidance from the Ninth Circuit, Federal District
Courts in California Find State Law Claims Preempted
Regardless of Preemption Standards
Three cases are predominately cited to support the proposition
that section 2923.5 is preempted using a HOLA analysis when a na-
tional bank forecloses on a home loan originated by a federal thrift
prior to Dodd-Frank’s implementation: (1) Zlotnik v. U.S. Bancorp,102
98. E.g., World of Trouble, supra note 87 (telling the story of borrower Betty Townes, an
elderly woman on a fixed income who purchased one of these loans and now has a
monthly mortgage payment greater than her income).
99. See WELLS FARGO ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 92, at 60 (“[W]e would expect the
following balances of loans to start fully amortizing due to reaching their recast anniversary
date: $101 million in 2013, $332 million in 2014 and $951 million in 2015.”).
100. See News Release, Wells Fargo, Wells Fargo Reports Record Quarterly New Income
13 (Apr. 12, 2013), available at https://www.wellsfargo.com/downloads/pdf/press/
1q13pr.pdf (demonstrating that the residential mortgage portfolio Wells Fargo acquired
from Wachovia was $40 billion and predominantly credit impaired); World of Trouble, supra
note 87 (“The losses from the Pick-A-Payment portfolio are now estimated at $36 billion.
Wachovia was so badly wounded, it was acquired by Wells Fargo with the help of a taxpayer
bailout.”).
101. See WELLS FARGO ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 92, at 61 (describing Wells Fargo’s
efforts to move Pick-a-Pay customers into other loan products to avoid foreclosure caused
by recast).
102. Zlotnik v. U.S. Bancorp, No. C 09-3855 PJH, 2009 WL 5178030 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 22,
2009).
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(2) DeLeon v. Wells Fargo Bank,103 and (3) Guerrero v. Wells Fargo
Bank.104 In Zlotnik and DeLeon, the HOLA analysis applied because
then-existing case law held that the NBA and HOLA analyses did not
differ. In Guerrero, the court subtly and incorrectly changed the mean-
ings of Zlotnik and DeLeon by holding that those cases asked the court
to look to whether a HOLA-regulated bank originated the loan and
not to what bank controlled the loan when the cause of action arose.
Finally, Haggarty v. Wells Fargo Bank105 provides a great example of how
this subtle change will have important consequences in determining
whether state laws like A.B. 278, are preempted since Dodd-Frank’s
passage.
1. Zlotnik v. U.S. Bank
Hava and James Zlotnik refinanced, through a broker, a loan on
their residence on June 30, 2005, with federal thrift Downey Savings
and Loan.106 The Zlotniks alleged that Downey committed an unlaw-
ful and unfair business practice under California’s Unfair Competi-
tion Law (“UCL”)107 by misstating the interest rate on the loan
application.108 On November 21, 2008, the FDIC closed Downey Sav-
ings and sold it to U.S. Bank, a national bank.109
On U.S. Bank’s motion to dismiss, the court conceded that the
complaint stated a UCL claim under the unfair prong.110 Nonetheless,
the court held that the HOLA field preemption analysis applied in
this case despite U.S. Bank’s status as a national bank111 regulated
under the NBA;112 therefore, the court found that the California UCL
was preempted.113
However, the HOLA field preemption analysis was applied not
because it was the proper analysis, but because at the time, case law
103. DeLeon v. Wells Fargo Bank, 729 F. Supp. 2d 1119 (N.D. Cal. 2010).
104. Guerrero v. Wells Fargo Bank, No. CV 10–5095–VBF(AJWx), 2010 WL 8971769
(C.D. Cal. Sept. 14, 2010).
105. Haggarty v. Wells Fargo Bank, No. C 10–02416 CRB, 2011 WL 445183 (N.D. Cal.
Feb. 2, 2011).
106. Zlotnik, 2009 WL 5178030, at *1, *6.
107. CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 17200 (West 2008).
108. See Zlotnik, 2009 WL 5178030, at *5.
109. Bank Acquisition Information: Information for Downey Savings and Loan Association,
F.A., Newport Beach, CA, FEDERAL DEPOSIT INSURANCE CORPORATION, http://www.fdic.gov/
bank/individual/failed/downey.html (last updated Jan. 4, 2013).
110. Zlotnik, 2009 WL 5178030, at *5.
111. See id. at *6.
112. See id.
113. See id. at *8.
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incorrectly held that an NBA preemption analysis was the same as a
HOLA analysis.114 The court never addressed whether to apply the
NBA or HOLA because, either way, the HOLA field preemption stan-
dard applied.115 In support, it relied on Aguayo v. U.S. Bank (Aguayo
I),116 a decision then on appeal to the Ninth Circuit.117
The OCC interprets the preemptive scopes of the NBA and
HOLA as having the same effect:
The extent of Federal regulation and supervision of Federal sav-
ings associations under the Home Owners’ Loan Act is substan-
tially the same as for national banks under the national banking
laws, a fact that warrants similar conclusions about the applicability of
state laws to the conduct of the Federally authorized [sic] activities
of both types of entities . . . . If preemption is to be construed in
the same way under the NBA as the HOLA, then the test for pre-
emption should also be the same.118
The district court then proceeds into a HOLA analysis, but does
so because “regardless of U.S. Bank’s status as a national association,
the preemption analysis remains the same.”119 Nothing here supports
the assertion, “[w]here a national association . . . acquires the loan of
a federal savings bank, it is proper to apply preemption under
HOLA.”120 Rather, the court erroneously held that NBA preemption
is not conflict preemption but rather HOLA field preemption, so it is
proper to use HOLA field preemption case law in support of preemp-
tion under the NBA.121
2. DeLeon v. Wells Fargo Bank
After purchasing a home in 2004, the DeLeons refinanced their
home with World Savings Bank in 2007.122 The refinancing was sub-
ject to a four-year adjustable-rate mortgage.123 The DeLeons fell be-
hind in the payments, and Wells Fargo, the successor to Wachovia,
who was the successor to World Savings, recorded a notice of default
114. See id. at *6.
115. See id. at *6–8 (“[R]egardless of U.S. Bank’s status as a national association, the
preemption analysis remains the same.”).
116. Aguayo v. U.S. Bank (Aguayo I), 658 F. Supp. 2d 1226 (S.D. Cal. 2009), rev’d, 653
F.3d 912 (9th Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 106 (2012).
117. See Zlotnik, 2009 WL 5178030, at *6 (citing Aguayo I, 658 F. Supp. 2d 1226).
118. Id. (quoting Aguayo I, 658 F. Supp. 2d at 1234).
119. Id.
120. Guerrero v. Wells Fargo Bank, No. CV 10–5095–VBF(AJWx), 2010 WL 8971769, at
*3 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 14, 2010) (citing Zlotnik, 2009 WL 5178030, at *6–8).
121. See Zlotnik, 2009 WL 5178030, at *6.
122. DeLeon v. Wells Fargo Bank, 729 F. Supp. 2d 1119, 1121 (N.D. Cal. 2010).
123. Id.
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in or around September 2009.124 Eventually, Wells Fargo completed
the foreclosure by purchasing the property at the trustee’s sale in Jan-
uary 2010.125
The DeLeons alleged causes of action for wrongful foreclosure,
violation of the California UCL, failure to comply with the Civil Code
section 2923.5 statutory notice requirements, and predatory
lending.126
Wells Fargo moved to dismiss all of the DeLeons’ claims as pre-
empted by HOLA.127 Wells Fargo based its motion on two theories:
(1) NBA preemption was the same as HOLA field preemption, and
(2) HOLA field preemption continued as a contract right it inherited
when it acquired the loan from World Savings.128
The court found the claims preempted.129 The court began its
discussion with a single sentence citing to no authority:
Wells Fargo notes that at the time the loan was made to the DeLe-
ons, “World Savings Bank, FSB was a federally chartered savings
bank organized and operating under HOLA” and observes cor-
rectly that the same preemption analysis would apply to any alleged
conduct after November 1, 2009, when the lender merged into a
national banking association.130
The court did not say which of Wells Fargo’s theories it was adopting
in applying HOLA field preemption to the DeLeons’ loan.
The bare claim that Wells Fargo “observes correctly” that it may
assert HOLA field preemption in these circumstances has been the
basis for future HOLA field preemption of section 2923.5 claims, even
those claims arising after Dodd-Frank came into law.131 The DeLeon
court’s failure to specify upon which theory it relied to apply HOLA
field preemption to a claim arising after Wells Fargo acquired Wacho-
124. Id.; First Amended Complaint at 3, DeLeon v. Wells Fargo Bank, 729 F. Supp. 2d
1119 (N.D. Cal. 2010) (No. 510–CV–01390 JF), 2010 WL 2844298; Plaintiffs’ Memoran-
dum of Points and Authorities in Opposition to Defendant Wells Fargo Bank’s Motion to
Dismiss at 2, DeLeon v. Wells Fargo Bank, 729 F. Supp. 2d 1119 (N.D. Cal. 2010) (No.
510–CV–01390 JF), 2010 WL 2844293.
125. See DeLeon, 729 F. Supp. 2d at 1121.
126. See id.
127. Id. at 1124.
128. See Reply in Support of Motion to Dismiss by Wells Fargo at 6–7, DeLeon, 729 F.
Supp. 2d 1119 (No. 5:10-cv-01390 JF), 2010 WL 2844296.
129. DeLeon, 729 F. Supp. 2d at 1126–28.
130. Id. at 1126.
131. See, e.g., Joseph v. Wachovia Mortg. Corp., No. 5:11–cv–02395 EJD, 2011 WL
5827224, at *3 n.3 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 18, 2011); Mullins v. Wells Fargo Bank, No.
2:13–cv–0453 JAM KJN PS, 2013 WL 5299181, at *10 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 18, 2013).
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via132 was a crucial point at which courts began to misinterpret why a
national bank could assert HOLA field preemption.133 In using
DeLeon to hold that the preemption standard relies entirely on who
originated the loan,134 courts have failed to dismiss the far more likely
rationale that DeLeon is not applying HOLA field preemption, but
NBA preemption. It just so happens that at that time, NBA preemp-
tion was erroneously held to be the same as HOLA field preemption,
explaining the court’s use of HOLA case law.135
As will be discussed later, the proper preemption standard to be
applied depends on which regulation governed the financial institu-
tion at the time the cause of action arose.136 If in DeLeon, Wachovia
had violated section 2923.5 by improperly recording a notice of de-
fault137 before its acquisition by Wells Fargo, Wells Fargo would have
been able to assert the HOLA defense regardless of the transition be-
cause it may assert whatever defenses Wachovia could have asserted at
the time of the violation.138 But since the cause of action arose when
Wells Fargo, a national bank, published the notice of default139 the
court should not have applied HOLA field preemption.140
3. Guerrero v. Wells Fargo Bank
The Guerreros obtained a home equity line of credit in May 2005
from World Savings.141 They began to have difficulty making their
132. See, e.g., DeLeon, 729 F. Supp. 2d at 1121, 1126 (stating that wrongful foreclosure
claim arose when a sale was completed in January 2010, after merger with Wells Fargo,
absent publication, posting, and recordation of notice of sale prior to sale).
133. See, e.g., Guerrero v. Wells Fargo Bank, No. CV 10–5095–VBF(AJWx), 2010 WL
8971769, at *3 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 14, 2010) (“Where a national association, such as Defen-
dant, acquires the loan of a federal savings bank, it is proper to apply preemption under
HOLA.”) (citing DeLeon, 729 F. Supp. 2d at 1126).
134. See id.
135. See Zlotnik v. U.S. Bancorp, No. C 09-3855 PJH, 2009 WL 5178030, at *6 (N.D. Cal.
Dec. 22, 2009) (citing Aguayo I, 658 F. Supp. 2d 1226, 1234 (S.D. Cal. 2009), rev’d 653 F.3d
912 (9th Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 106 (2012)).
136. See infra Part III.C.
137. CAL. CIV. CODE § 2923.5(a) (West 2012) (pre-A.B. 278 version).
138. See, e.g., In re Ocwen Loan Servicing, L.L.C. Mortg. Servicing Litig., 491 F.3d 638,
642 (7th Cir. 2007) (allowing a loan servicer that gave up its federal thrift charter to assert
HOLA field preemption because it committed the acts for which the plaintiffs were suing
under state law when it was still a federal thrift).
139. First Amended Complaint at 3, DeLeon v. Wells Fargo Bank, 729 F. Supp. 2d 1119
(N.D. Cal. 2010) (No. 510–CV–01390 JF), 2010 WL 2844298; Plaintiffs’ Memorandum of
Points and Authorities in Opposition to Defendant Wells Fargo Bank’s Motion to Dismiss
at 2, DeLeon v. Wells Fargo Bank, 729 F. Supp. 2d 1119 (N.D. Cal. 2010) (No.
510–CV–01390 JF), 2010 WL 2844293.
140. See infra Part III.C.
141. Guerrero, 2010 WL 8971769, at *1.
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payments in April 2009.142 In January 2010, Wells Fargo recorded a
Notice of Default and Election to Sell, with a sale date of May 13,
2010.143 The foreclosure sale was completed on that day.144 The Guer-
reros filed a claim alleging various state causes of action.145
In determining whether a HOLA or NBA preemption analysis ap-
plied, the court erred in holding, “Where a national association, such
as Defendant, acquires the loan of a federal savings bank, it is proper
to apply preemption under HOLA.”146 In citing to DeLeon and Zlotnik,
the court confuses their holdings and performs a HOLA analysis for
the wrong reason. The courts, in both DeLeon and Zlotnik, performed a
HOLA analysis on the theory that the NBA and HOLA field preemp-
tion analyses were the same; therefore, deciding which causes should
be subject to a HOLA analysis and which to an NBA analysis was not
important.147 The Guerrero court now applies HOLA under the theory
that no matter which entity is responsible for each cause of action,
HOLA applies because the loan originated with a HOLA-regulated
institution.148
Recall in DeLeon that the section 2923.5 claim, filing a notice of
default without satisfying the borrower contact requirements, arose
before Wells Fargo acquired Wachovia, and thus is properly examined
under HOLA field preemption. The wrongful foreclosure claim, aris-
ing out of the foreclosure sale, materialized after Wells Fargo acquired
Wachovia, and so should be examined under NBA preemption. If it is
true that an NBA analysis is the same as a HOLA analysis, as held in
Zlotnik, then claims for which Wells Fargo is originally responsible are
evaluated under the NBA, but it just happens to be the same as a
HOLA analysis. But if the NBA analysis is not the same as a HOLA
analysis, then the Wells Fargo claims are not evaluated using HOLA
case law, but under a separate NBA analysis.
Under Guerrero, however, even if NBA preemption is not the same
as HOLA field preemption, HOLA field preemption would apply if
142. Id. at *2.
143. Id. at *1–2 (“In January 2008 World Savings Bank, FSB, changed its name to Wa-
chovia Mortgage, FSB, which then merged into Defendant, Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., in
November 2009.”).
144. Id. at *2.
145. Id.
146. Id. at *3 (citing DeLeon v. Wells Fargo Bank, 729 F. Supp. 2d 1119, 1126 (N.D.
Cal. 2010)).
147. See supra Part III.A.1–2.
148. See Guerrero, 2010 WL 8971769, at *3.
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the loan note originated with a federal thrift, even if the cause of ac-
tion arose when the note was held by a national bank.149
4. Haggarty v. Wells Fargo Bank
Over a short period, U.S. District Courts in California have ap-
plied Zlotnik, DeLeon, and Guerrero over and over with little opposition
by plaintiffs for actions related to thrift-originated loans.150 A stark ex-
ample can be found in Haggarty v. Wells Fargo Bank.151
Haggarty and others were former mortgage customers of Wacho-
via who had adjustable rate mortgages pegged to an index that relied
in part on Wachovia’s cost to borrow funds.152 When Wachovia
merged into Wells Fargo, the index shot up an incredible amount,
and along with it those adjustable mortgage rates.153 The plaintiffs
sought to certify a class of such borrowers154 and contended:
Wells Fargo violated various federal and state laws, breached its
contracts, and committed fraud when it did not (1) inform its new
customers that the [index] would (and did) rise as a result of its
merger with Wachovia and/or (2) exercise its discretionary con-
tractual power to peg their interest rates to another index unaf-
fected by the merger.155
In determining whether their state law claims were preempted,
the court resolved whether HOLA or the NBA applied by holding:
It appears that HOLA does apply because Plaintiffs’ loan originator
was a federal savings bank. “Where a national association, such as
[Wells Fargo], acquires the loan of a federal savings bank, it is
proper to apply preemption under HOLA.” Guerrero v. Wells Fargo
Bank, N.A. . . . This is true even though the conduct at issue oc-
curred after Wells Fargo merged with Wachovia. DeLeon v. Wells
149. See Guerrero, 2010 WL 8971769, at *3.
150. See, e.g., Sato v. Wachovia Mortg., No. 5:11–cv–00810 EJD (PSG), 2011 WL
2784567, at *5 (N.D. Cal. July 13, 2011) (applying all three cases while also noting that a
HOLA analysis also applies under the NBA); Joseph v. Wachovia Mortg. Corp., No.
5:11–cv–02395 EJD, 2011 WL 5827224, at *3 n.3 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 18, 2011) (applying all
three cases), Gonzalez v. Wells Fargo Bank, No. 5:12–cv–03842 EJD, 2012 WL 5350035, at
*2 n.3 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 29, 2012) (applying all three cases).
151. Haggarty v. Wells Fargo Bank, No. C 10–02416 CRB, 2011 WL 445183 (N.D. Cal.
Feb. 2, 2011).
152. Id. at *1 (“Plaintiffs are former mortgage customers of Wachovia who held adjusta-
ble rate mortgages indexed to the 11th District Cost of Funds Index (‘COFI’). The COFI
represents the weighted average interest rate on deposits paid each month by ‘Reporting
Members.’ Wachovia was one of the Reporting Members, but Wells Fargo was and is not.”).
153. See id. (“When Wells Fargo merged with Wachovia, the COFI shot up 85 basis
points because Wachovia’s deposits were removed from the weighted average reflect in the
COFI. This, in turn, caused Plaintiffs’ mortgage loan rates to increase.”).
154. Id. at *2.
155. Id. at *1.
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Fargo Bank, N.A. . . . (“Wells Fargo notes that at the time the loan
was made to the DeLeons, ‘World Savings Bank, FSB was a feder-
ally chartered savings bank organized and operating under HOLA’
and observes correctly that the same preemption analysis would ap-
ply to any alleged conduct after November 1, 2009, when the
lender merged into a national banking association.”).156
Haggarty encapsulates what has gone wrong. DeLeon never asked
the court to identify the origin of the loan—despite the Guerrero court’s
apparent interpretation that it did.157 Rather, DeLeon relied on case law
that held that a HOLA analysis applies for causes of action arising
both before and after Wachovia (a thrift) merged into Wells Fargo (a
national bank) because there is no difference between a HOLA and
NBA analysis.158
B. The Ninth Circuit Reverses Aguayo, and Lower Courts Should
Have Recognized That Zlotnik and DeLeon Were No
Longer Good Law
Recall that Aguayo was the foundation upon which Zlotnik, DeLeon,
Guerrero, and Haggarty relied.159 In Aguayo the plaintiff executed a
purchase money security agreement for a Ford Expedition from a
dealership in California in August 2003.160 The dealership shortly
thereafter assigned the loan to U.S. Bank, a national bank.161 When
Aguayo defaulted on the loan, U.S. Bank repossessed the vehicle.162
After repossessing the vehicle, U.S. Bank sent Aguayo a notice that it
intended to sell the vehicle, and that if the vehicle sold for less than
the amount Aguayo owed, U.S. Bank would attempt to collect the defi-
ciency.163 The notice, however, failed to meet the requirements of
California’s Rees-Levering Automobile Sales Finance Act,164 and the
penalty for non-compliance is forfeiture of the deficiency.165 Aguayo
brought a Rees-Levering claim and a claim under the California UCL,
156. Id. at *4 (citations omitted).
157. See supra Part III.A.3.
158. See id.
159. See supra Part III.A.
160. Aguayo II, 653 F.3d 912, 916 (9th Cir. 2011), cert denied, 133 S. Ct. 106 (2012).
161. Id.
162. Id.
163. Id.
164. CAL. CIV. CODE § 2981–2984.6 (West 2012 & Supp. 2013).
165. See Aguayo II, 653 F.3d at 919 (“[L]ender may not collect a deficiency judgment
from the buyer if the disposition of the repossessed motor vehicle did not conform with
the provisions of [Rees-Levering].”).
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and sought to certify a class of himself and similarly situated California
consumers.166
The district court held that the NBA and the OCC-implementing
regulation preempted the Rees-Levering Act and the UCL by reading
the regulation in the same manner that the OTS read its regulation
governing HOLA field preemption:
[T]he OTS first considers whether the state law is covered by the
list of expressly preempted areas. If the state law fits in the list of
laws preempted, then the analysis is over. Courts need not consider
whether the state law also fits under the areas listed in the savings
clause.167
The district court reasoned that the Rees-Levering post-repossession
notice requirement regulates “[d]isclosure” and was a law requiring
“specific statements” in some “credit-related document” found in the
OCC preemption regulation.168 While noting that Aguayo had argued
the savings clause should avoid preempting Rees-Levering as a state
law governing contracts and the rights to collect debts, it declined to
examine the savings clause.169
The Ninth Circuit reversed Aguayo by criticizing the district
court’s reliance on an OTS interpretive letter170 to justify refusing to
apply the savings clause in the OCC regulations:
The OTS, unlike the OCC, has explicit full field preemption. . . .
. . . [W]hile the OTS and the OCC regulations are similar in
many ways, . . . the OCC has explicitly avoided full field preemp-
tion in its rulemaking and has not been granted full field preemp-
tion by Congress. . . . “The language employed by the OCC in its
regulations and interpretive letters evidences that application of a
more narrow preemption analysis is more appropriate than [the
OTS preemption analysis] [that has been previously applied]”. . . .
. . . .
We agree with courts that have refused to apply the OTS pre-
emption analysis when analyzing OCC regulations.171
Since HOLA and NBA analyses are not the same, to apply HOLA
case law to causes of actions arising when an OCC-regulated bank con-
166. Id. at 916.
167. Aguayo I, 658 F. Supp. 2d 1226, 1234 (S.D. Cal. 2009), rev’d, 653 F.3d 912 (9th Cir.
2011), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 106 (2012) (citation omitted).
168. Id. at 1232 (citing 12 C.F.R. § 7.4008(d)(2)(viii) (2011), amended by Office of
Thrift Supervision Integration; Dodd-Frank Act Implementation, 76 Fed. Reg. 43549,
43565 (July 21, 2011) (codified at C.F.R. § 7.4008(d)(8) (2012)).
169. See id. at 1234.
170. National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws & American Law
Institute, OCC Interpretive Letter No. 1005, (2005–2006 Transfer Binder) Fed. Banking L.
Rep. (CCH) ¶ 81-534 (June 10, 2004).
171. Aguayo II, 653 F.3d at 921–22 (citations omitted).
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trols the loan is no longer appropriate.172 Moreover, Dodd-Frank en-
ded field preemption as of July 21, 2011, and field preemption is no
longer applicable to any cause of action arising after that date.173
In Zlotnik, new meaning is given to the conclusion, “If preemp-
tion is to be construed in the same way under the NBA as the HOLA,
then the test for preemption should also be the same.”174 Now that
courts should not construe preemption in the same way, they should
not test preemption for state laws against national banks using HOLA
field preemption case law.
In DeLeon, the conclusion that HOLA field preemption applied
also cannot survive. Besides equating NBA preemption with HOLA
field preemption, the only support for applying HOLA field preemp-
tion was a general statement of California law allowing the succeeding
entity of a merger—here, Wells Fargo as the successor of Wachovia,
which in turn was the successor of World Savings—to succeed to the
contract rights, property, debts, and liabilities of its predecessor.175
While this allows Wells Fargo to assert HOLA field preemption to state
causes of action attributable to these predecessor entities, HOLA field
preemption is not a contract right that is passed on as loan rights are
assigned.176
C. Courts Need to Recognize the Error in Accepting that the
Originator of a Loan Determines the Preemption
Standard for Post-Origination Conduct
While the courts should recognize that two preemption standards
now exist, Aguayo still does not reverse the mistake of using loan origi-
nation as the exclusive method of determining which preemption
standard to apply. In Aguayo, the installment payment contract for
Aguayo’s vehicle was assigned to U.S. Bank from the dealer.177 There
was never a switch between one federal preemption standard to an-
other. While not specifically raised, the court assumed an OCC pre-
172. See id. at 922 (“We agree with courts that have refused to apply the OTS preemp-
tion analysis when analyzing OCC regulations.”).
173. See Tamburri v. Suntrust Mortg., Inc., 875 F. Supp. 2d 1009, 1020 (N.D. Cal. 2012)
(“[N]ot only is HOLA preemption inapplicable to NBA cases, it is no longer applicable at
all to any post-Dodd-Frank transactions.”).
174. Zlotnik v. U.S. Bancorp, No. C 09-3855 PJH, 2009 WL 5178030, at *6 (citing
Aguayo I, 658 F. Supp. 2d at 1234).
175. See Reply in Support of Motion to Dismiss by Wells Fargo at 6–7, DeLeon v. Wells
Fargo Bank, 729 F. Supp. 2d 1119 (N.D. Cal. 2010) (No. 5:10-cv-01390 JF), 2010 WL
2844296.
176. See infra Part III.C.
177. Aguayo II, 653 F.3d at 916.
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emption analysis applied because U.S. Bank, a national bank, was
responsible for the Rees-Levering Act violation.178
Instead of relying solely on Zlotnik and DeLeon, Guerrero also relied
on a general statement of California corporations law which states: “In
a merger the surviving entity ‘succeeds to the rights, property, debts
and liabilities, without other transfer.’”179 Is HOLA field preemption
a right that runs with a loan even after assignment to a non-thrift
bank? Several cases suggest the answer is no.
In re Ocwen Loan Servicing, L.L.C. Mortgage Servicing Litigation180
dealt with a class-action suit raising various state-law claims against a
mortgage loan servicer that was, during the relevant period, a federal
thrift subject to HOLA.181 While much of Judge Posner’s opinion was
devoted to his disgust with the “hideous sprawling mess” of the com-
plaint,182 he took care to emphasize, “Ocwen has given up its federal
thrift charter; but this does not affect its defense that when it commit-
ted the acts for which the plaintiffs are suing any state-law claims
based on those acts were preempted.”183 This sentence lays the
groundwork for establishing that field preemption does not run with
the loan, and that the relevant preemption standard is based not on
the loan’s originator but on what regulation applied when the cause
of action arose.184
In Valtierra v. Wells Fargo Bank185 the plaintiffs alleged that Wells
Fargo engaged in various frauds ranging from the origination of the
loan by World Savings Bank to their home’s eventual foreclosure sale
by Wells Fargo.186 The loan was originated and a notice of default was
recorded before Wells Fargo acquired Wachovia Bank, but a notice of
sale was recorded and the sale completed afterwards.187
178. See id. at 919.
179. Guerrero v. Wells Fargo Bank, No. CV 10–5095–VBF(AJWx), 2010 WL 8971769, at
*3 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 14, 2010) (quoting 9 WITKIN, SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA LAW, CORPORA-
TIONS § 198 (10th ed. 2005)).
180. 491 F.3d 638 (7th Cir. 2007).
181. Id. at 641–42.
182. Id. at 641.
183. Id. at 642.
184. See Taguinod v. World Savings Bank, 755 F. Supp. 2d 1064, 1068–69 (C.D. Cal.
2010) (citing In re Ocwen, 491 F.3d at 642 (stating that the defendant could rely on its
HOLA preemption defense, although it had given up its federal thrift charter, because it
was a federal savings association at the time of the conduct at issue)).
185. Valtierra v. Wells Fargo Bank, No. CIV–F–10–0849 AWI GSA, 2011 WL 590596
(E.D. Cal. Feb. 10, 2011).
186. See id. at *2.
187. Id. at *1.
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The district court engaged in a comprehensive discussion of
whether to apply HOLA, concluding that those acts which clearly
arose while World Savings or Wachovia controlled the loan were ap-
propriately considered through the lens of HOLA field preemp-
tion.188 However, once Wells Fargo took over on November 1, 2009,
California state causes of action arising from activity that occurred
past that point could no longer be analyzed under HOLA.189
One Arizona federal judge sums up the argument against apply-
ing HOLA field preemption by severely criticizing Guerrero:
Wells Fargo argues that HOLA preemption “sticks” to any loan
originating with a federal savings bank.
The plain language of [12 C.F.R.] § 560.2 demonstrates that
this argument is without merit. . . .
Wells Fargo has nonetheless cited several cases stating that
Wells Fargo enjoys the HOLA preemption enjoyed by World Sav-
ings and Wachovia. But as authority for that proposition, these
cases cite either (a) nothing, (b) each other, or (c) general state-
ments of law about corporations succeeding to the right of the en-
tities they acquire . . . . But preemption is not some sort of asset that can
be bargained, sold, or transferred. HOLA preemption was created by
the OTS for the benefit of federal savings associations, and § 560.2
plainly seeks to avoid burdening the operations of federal savings
associations. . . . Wells Fargo is not a federal savings association, and
its cited cases are therefore not persuasive. HOLA preemption
does not apply to Wells Fargo.190
188. See id. at *5–6 (concluding that the California UCL and fraud claims based on
origination practices of World Savings were barred by HOLA field preemption); id. at *4
(“Causes of action arising on or after November 1, 2009 (date of conversion to national
bank) will not be preempted . . . . Plaintiff alleges that Wells Fargo sent him a letter outlin-
ing a short sale program that would have avoided foreclosure and then foreclosed in viola-
tion of the program’s terms. There is no indication when the letter was sent and/or
discussions about the short sale program took place. Thus, the court can not [sic] assume
that these acts would be subject to HOLA preemption at this point.”).
189. See id. at *4; accord Scott v. Wells Fargo Bank, Civil No. 10–3368 (MJD/SER), 2011
WL 3837077, at *4 (D. Minn. Aug. 29, 2011) (“[T]he best supported rule is for courts to
look ‘to see whether the alleged violations took place when the banking entity was covered
by HOLA.’”) (citing Valtierra, 2011 WL 3837077, at *3.); Ramirez v. Wells Fargo Bank, No.
C 10–05874 WHA, 2011 WL 1585075, at *7 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 27, 2011) (applying HOLA field
preemption to dismiss causes of action clearly arising before Wachovia merged into Wells
Fargo, but refusing to dismiss causes of action that may have arisen after the merger as
governed under NBA preemption).
190. Gerber v. Wells Fargo Bank, No. CV 11–01083–PHX–NVW, 2012 WL 413997, at
*3–4 (D. Ariz. Feb. 9, 2012) (italicized emphasis in original) (underlined emphasis added)
(citing DeLeon v. Wells Fargo Bank, 729 F. Supp. 2d 1119, 1126 (N.D. Cal. 2010) (applying
HOLA after Wachovia merged into Wells Fargo, without citing authority); Haggarty v.
Wells Fargo Bank, No. C 10–02416 CRB, 2011 WL 445183, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 2, 2011)
(applying DeLeon, 729 F. Supp. 2d 1119; Guerrero v. Wells Fargo Bank, No. CV
10–5095–VBF(AJWx), 2010 WL 8971769 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 14, 2010)); Guerrero, 2010 WL
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These well-supported cases would seem to put a stop to decisions
that continue to apply HOLA field preemption to state law claims at-
tributable to national banks based solely on a federal thrift’s origina-
tion of the loan. Unfortunately, foreclosure prevention counsel has
apparently not picked up on these changes, resulting in numerous
opinions that for the most part quickly skip over whether to apply
HOLA or the NBA to post-merger activities.191
If federal courts in California were to recognize, as they should,
that the date the cause of action arose determines the appropriate
preemption standard, three areas exist where California homeowners
will no longer face preemption of the procedural rights in foreclosure
afforded by A.B. 278: (1) non-federal bank entities that acquire rights
to loans originated by federal thrifts; (2) national banks that have suc-
ceeded to loans originated by federal thrifts; and (3) federal thrifts
that have retained the loans they originated since the implementation
of the Dodd-Frank preemption reforms. The first can be quickly dis-
missed because a state-regulated entity cannot assert preemption. As
to the second and third, neither the NBA nor HOLA currently
preempts laws relating to national banks or federal thrifts that have
succeeded to the loans they own or service.
IV. Post Dodd-Frank Banking Preemption Does Not Preempt
A.B. 278
Recall that in Aguayo v. U.S. Bank, the Ninth Circuit found that it
was not appropriate to apply a HOLA analysis in determining whether
a state statute is preempted by the NBA.192 This raises the question,
what analysis should be performed under the NBA?193 The Ninth Cir-
cuit answered this question by first examining the rules the OCC
8971769, at *3 (citing 9 WITKIN, SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA LAW, CORPORATIONS § 198 (10th
ed. 2005))).
191. See, e.g., Tuck v. Wells Fargo Home Mortg., No. C–12–01796 DMR, 2012 WL
2906738, at *3 (N.D. Cal. July 13, 2012) (“Plaintiffs concede that their first two causes of
action under Civil Code sections 2923.5 and 2924 [which arose post-merger] would likely
be held preempted . . . .”); Kim v. Wells Fargo Bank, No. 5:12–cv–02066 EJD, 2012 WL
4845614, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 10, 2012) (noting that “plaintiffs do not provide argument
in opposition” to applying HOLA to causes of action arising post-merger); Fernandez v.
Wells Fargo Bank, No. 12–cv–03941 NC, 2012 WL 5350256, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 29, 2012)
(illustrating a lack of opposition by the plaintiffs in applying HOLA in the first place, only
that HOLA did not preempt).
192. See Aguayo II, 653 F.3d 912, 922 (9th Cir. 2011), cert denied, 133 S. Ct. 106 (2012)
(“We agree with courts that have refused to apply the OTS preemption analysis when ana-
lyzing OCC regulations.”); supra Part III.B.
193. See generally Aguayo II, 653 F.3d at 922–28 (defining the NBA analysis).
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promulgated “specifically directed toward identifying which state laws
affecting national banks are preempted.”194 The Ninth Circuit ex-
amined national banks’ authority to make loans not secured by real
estate and the applicability of state law to such loans.195 There were
three portions of 12 C.F.R. § 7.4008 at issue: (1) State laws that “ob-
struct, impair, or condition” national bank powers to make non-real
estate loans,196 (2) express preemption of state laws concerning “dis-
closure and advertising” that may limit those powers,197 and (3) a sav-
ings clause for laws that only incidentally affect the exercise of
national banks’ non-real estate lending powers in contracts and rights
to collect debts.198
A. The NBA Preemption Standard Does Not Preempt A.B. 278
Based on the Ninth Circuit’s Interpretation in Aguayo of
the Construction of the NBA’s Preemption
Regulation
The Ninth Circuit began its NBA preemption analysis by employ-
ing “the standard canon of construction that requires a reviewing
court to read a statute or regulation in its entirety when performing a
preemption analysis which, in this case, requires the court to consider
both the express preemption and savings clauses together.”199 The
court gave further credence to the savings clause, noting that the sub-
ject of the litigation—collecting on a debt secured by the car—was a
subject in the savings clause.200
In examining the savings clause, the Aguayo court examined how
the OCC had chosen the language “right to collect debts” based on
the Supreme Court’s decision in National Bank v. Commonwealth.201
The court noted:
[N]ational banks “are subject to the laws of the State, and are gov-
erned in their daily course of business far more by the laws of the
State than of the nation. . . . Their acquisition and transfer of prop-
194. Id. at 919.
195. Id. at 920 (examining 12 C.F.R. § 7.4008 (2011), amended by Office of Thrift Super-
vision Integration, Dodd-Frank Act Implementation, 76 Fed. Reg. 43549, 43565 (July 21,
2011)).
196. Aguayo II, 653 F.3d at 920; 12 C.F.R. § 7.4008(d)(1) (2013).
197. Aguayo II, 653 F.3d at 920; 12 C.F.R § 7.4008(d)(2).
198. Aguayo II, 653 F.3d at 920; 12 C.F.R. § 7.4008(e).
199. Aguayo II, 653 F.3d at 922.
200. Id. at 923; 12 C.F.R. § 7.4008(e)(4).
201. 76 U.S. (9 Wall.) 353, 362 (1869).
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erty, their right to collect their debts, and their liability to be sued
for debts, are all based on State law.”202
The NBA’s real estate lending preemption regulation matches
the non-real estate lending preemption regulation practically word for
word.203 The various steps required in A.B. 278,204 such as contacting
the borrower about alternatives to foreclosure,205 are steps required
before a qualifying entity may proceed in the notices required under
California’s non-judicial foreclosure scheme.206 Consequently, these
requirements have everything to do with the right to collect a debt
and the transfer of real property.207
B. Federally-Chartered Banks that Desire to Use State Law to
Foreclose Without Judicial Intervention Cannot Pick and
Choose Which Aspects of State Law to Follow
The Ninth Circuit in Aguayo II then criticized U.S. Bank’s at-
tempts to find preemption from the broad category of “rights to col-
lect debts.”208 The court asked, “[w]hat, if any, law would apply to U.S.
Bank’s post-repossession actions in the state of California? It would
not be bound by state law as enacted by the California legislature, nor
would it be operating under any specific federal law because no fed-
202. Aguayo II, 653 F.3d at 923 (quoting Nat’l Bank v. Commonwealth, 76 U.S. (9
Wall.) 353, 362 (1869)).
203. Compare 12 C.F.R. § 34.4 (“State laws on the following subjects are not inconsistent
with the real estate lending powers of national banks and apply to national banks to the
extent consistent with [Barnett Bank]: . . . Rights to collect debts; . . . [and] Acquisition and
transfer of real property.”) with 12 C.F.R. § 7.4008 (“State laws on the following subjects are
not inconsistent with the non-real estate lending powers of national banks and apply to
national banks to the extent consistent with [Barnett Bank]: . . . Rights to collect debts; . . .
[and] Acquisition and transfer of real property.”).
204. See supra Part II.A (explaining the requirements for compliance with A.B. 278).
205. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 2923.55(b) (West Supp. 2013).
206. See id. § 2923.55(a) (prohibiting a mortgage servicer, mortgage trustee, benefici-
ary, or authorized agent from recording a notice of default until: (1) written notification
has been sent, (2) thirty days after contact requirement or due diligence requirement has
been satisfied, and (3) the appropriate entity has properly rejected an application for a
loan modification).
207. See DENNIS L. GREENWALD ET AL., CALIFORNIA PRACTICE GUIDE: REAL PROPERTY
TRANSACTIONS § 6:514.2 (2012).
The comprehensive statutory scheme governing nonjudicial foreclosures . . . has
three purposes: (1) to provide the creditor/beneficiary with a quick, inexpensive
and efficient remedy against a defaulting debtor/trustor; (2) to protect the
debtor/trustor from wrongful loss of the property; and (3) to ensure that a prop-
erly conducted sale is final between the parties and conclusive as to a bona fide
purchaser.
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
208. Aguayo II, 653 F.3d 912, 924 (9th Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 106 (2012).
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eral law governs self-help repossession.”209 The court further criticized
U.S. Bank’s attempt to use California law that allows it to repossess the
vehicle without judicial intervention, while exempting itself from the
penalty for failing to provide the notice required by that same law.210
Servicers, banks, and other entities seeking preemption of A.B.
278 in their efforts to foreclose must be asked the same question:
what, if any law, would apply to such entities in their efforts to repos-
sess real property in California?211 Other than two statutes for non-
judicial foreclosure of residential mortgages held by the United States
Department of Housing and Urban Development,212 there is no fed-
eral law governing the foreclosure process.213 These entities seek pre-
emption of the very law that entitles them to foreclose without judicial
intervention in the first place.214 If these entities do not wish to abide
by California’s non-judicial foreclosure scheme requirements, Califor-
nia law also provides for foreclosure with judicial oversight.215 Every
state provides for at least the choice of judicial foreclosure, and it “is
the exclusive method of foreclosure in over one-third of the states.”216
209. Id.
210. Id. at 924–25 (“Now that it has sold Aguayo’s car, U.S. Bank wishes to collect the
remainder of the debt, yet now claims that while it could act under color of state law, . . . it
no longer needs to comply with state law in collecting the remaining debt owed. We
disagree.”).
211. See Gerber v. Wells Fargo Bank, No. CV 11–01083–PHX–NVW, 2012 WL 413997,
at *8 (D. Ariz. Feb. 9, 2012) (rejecting Wells Fargo’s argument that applying an Arizona
consumer fraud law to foreclosure actually related to servicing, because such preemption
would bring into doubt every state’s foreclosure laws, including basic notice requirements).
212. See Grant S. Nelson, Confronting the Mortgage Meltdown: A Brief for the Federalization of
State Mortgage Foreclosure Law, 37 PEPP. L. REV. 583, 605 (2010) (“[T]he 1980s and 90s saw
the enactment of two less sweeping federal foreclosure statutes. Each provides for nonjudi-
cial foreclosure of residential mortgages held by the Housing and Urban Development
Department . . . .”).
213. Id. (discussing congressional considerations to enacting a comprehensive federal
foreclosure scheme).
214. See Aguayo II, 653 F.3d at 925 (“[U.S. Bank] cannot now claim its use of the state
law remedy of repossession to recover a debt is permissible but then claim the same regula-
tion that gives the bank the power to use the remedy also affects the very core of its lending
operations.”).
215. See CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE §§ 725a (West 2012 & Supp. 2013) (granting the right to
bring suit to foreclose on real property).
216. Andrea J. Boyack, Community Collateral Damage: A Question of Priorities, 43 LOY. U.
CHI. L.J. 53, 90–91 (2011).
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C. Courts Must Apply the NBA’s Savings Clause to Preserve State
Authority to Govern the Procedures for the Transfer of
Real Property
The Ninth Circuit subsequently dismissed U.S. Bank’s last at-
tempt to avoid the NBA preemption savings clause by refusing the
bank’s argument that the Rees-Levering Act does more than “inciden-
tally affect the exercise of [its] non-real estate lending powers.”217 The
Ninth Circuit did not agree with U.S. Bank because the state statute
did not “affect the bank’s lending operations. . . . While U.S. Bank may
argue that any law that affects its ability to recover a debt necessarily
affects its lending operations, that type of rule would swallow all
laws . . . .”218 Thus, the Ninth Circuit applied the savings clause, immu-
nizing the Rees-Levering Act from NBA preemption.
In the same way, the courts should reject attempts to refuse to
apply the NBA’s preemption savings clause to A.B. 278. Because A.B.
278 does not demand a particular result,219 requiring such entities to
make a phone call or give a borrower a single point of contact to dis-
cuss their alternatives to foreclosure does not affect a bank’s lending
operations. Recall also that nothing in A.B. 278 requires any entity to
offer an alternative to foreclosure, but only to make the borrower
aware generally, that alternatives exist. Such alternatives might not
necessarily be renegotiation of loan terms but could be something like
a deed in lieu of foreclosure or a short sale.220
D. The NBA’s Preemption of State Laws Governing Servicing Does
Not Extend to State Laws Governing Foreclosure
Even given that the savings clause protecting state laws governing
the “rights to collect debts” or the “transfer of real property” applies, it
does not act independently but rather in conjunction with the NBA
preemption regulation’s express preemption clause.221 In Aguayo, U.S.
217. Aguayo II, 653 F.3d at 925; 12 C.F.R. § 7.4008(e) (2013).
218. Aguayo II, 653 F.3d at 925.
219. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 2923.4(a) (West 2012 & Supp. 2013) (“Nothing in the act
that added this section, however, shall be interpreted to require a particular result of [the
consideration for a loan modification or other alternative to foreclosure].”).
220. See id.; 10 HARRY D. MILLER & MARVIN B. STARR, CALIFORNIA REAL ESTATE § 43 (3d
ed. 2012) (defining a deed in lieu of foreclosure as a conveyance of the property to the
beneficiary of a deed of trust in exchange for cancellation of the foreclosure sale and often
cancellation of the secured debt); id. § 66.10 (defining short sale as a sale of property for a
price less than the amount of debt on the property, in which, to cancel the debt, the
borrower/seller must provide additional funds to pay off the loan unless the lender agrees
to waive part of the debt or accept less than the full amount due).
221. See Aguayo II, 653 F.3d at 925.
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Bank argued that “disclosure requirements” and “other credit-related
documents” expressly preempted by the NBA regulation preempted
debt collection notices like that found in Rees-Levering.222 The Ninth
Circuit again disagreed, engaging in a detailed discussion of what con-
stituted a notice.223
California federal courts should undertake a similar analysis
when presented with A.B. 278’s requirements. One requirement—to
contact the borrower about alternatives to foreclosure—has already
been presented in the Northern District of California and held not
preempted under the NBA.224 In Tamburri v. Suntrust Mortgage,225 the
court adopted the reasoning of Gerber v. Wells Fargo Bank,226 finding
that laws governing foreclosure were “not among the NBA’s expressly
preempted state laws in 12 C.F.R. § 34.4(a).”227 The court also dis-
missed the possibility raised by Suntrust Mortgage that the contact re-
quirement was expressly preempted as a law related to “servicing,”
agreeing with Gerber that “servicing” does not extend to state foreclo-
sure laws because the preemption regulation explicitly mentions other
phases of a loan’s existence, like “processing” or “origination,” but did
not list “foreclosure.”228 Foreclosure has been a longstanding state in-
terest, such that the Supreme Court “has imposed a clear statement
rule on any statutes that could potentially be construed to impinge on
that interest.”229
Additionally, with regard to regulatory interpretation, “[t]he
OCC itself has confirmed that state foreclosure laws are not generally
222. See id. at 925–27.
223. See id. at 927 (differentiating a state’s regulation of “other credit-related docu-
ments” of an ongoing lending relationship—which would be preempted—with a Rees-Lev-
ering notification, which is sent after a borrower has elected to end the lending
relationship and would thus not be preempted).
224. See Tamburri v. Suntrust Mortg., Inc., 875 F. Supp. 2d 1009, 1016–22 (N.D. Cal.
2012) (applying NBA preemption and finding the pre-A.B. 278 version of section 2923.5
(later enacted as sections 2923.5 and 2923.55 by A.B. 278) not preempted).
225. Id. at 1009.
226. Gerber v. Wells Fargo Bank, No. CV 11–01083–PHX–NVW, 2012 WL 413997 (D.
Ariz. Feb. 9, 2012).
227. Tamburri, 875 F. Supp. 2d at 1019 (citing Gerber, 2012 WL 413997, at *8); see also 12
C.F.R. § 34.4(a)(10) (2013) (stating that the NBA preempts state law limitations concern-
ing “processing, origination, servicing, sale or purchase of, or investment or participation
in, mortgages”).
228. Tamburri, 875 F. Supp. 2d at 1019.
229. Id. (citing BFP v. Resolution Trust Corp., 511 U.S. 531, 541–44 (1994) (describing
the long history of state regulation of the foreclosure process and declining to read a provi-
sion of the Bankruptcy Code as disrupting “the ancient harmony that foreclosure law and
fraudulent conveyance law . . . have heretofore enjoyed”)).
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within the scope of NBA preemption.”230 Therefore, the Ninth Circuit
should find that the contact requirement and the other requirements
affecting California’s non-judicial foreclosure process are not pre-
empted under the NBA.
Finally, now that Dodd-Frank has rendered HOLA thrift preemp-
tion as equivalent to NBA preemption, HOLA field preemption can-
not preempt A.B. 278 causes of action.231 Dodd-Frank “changed
the . . . HOLA preemption analysis and mandates that HOLA preemp-
tion would now follow the more lenient NBA conflict preemption
standard. . . . Thus, not only is HOLA preemption inapplicable to
NBA cases, it is no longer applicable at all to any post-Dodd-Frank
transactions.”232
Conclusion
This Comment contends that California district courts and fore-
closure prevention counsel have predominately failed to recognize re-
cent changes to the powers of federally chartered banks to preempt
state foreclosure laws. Some courts have recognized that pre-Dodd-
Frank HOLA field preemption standards should never have been ap-
plied to causes of action that arise when national banks hold the loan,
and no longer apply to any causes of action arising after July 21, 2011.
Others have not. And many courts have failed to notice that the
proper preemption standard does not depend on with whom the loan
originated, but rather on which standard applied to the entity respon-
sible for violating California law when the violation occurred.
This point must be recognized to preserve important reforms Cal-
ifornia enacted in A.B. 278 to try to decrease foreclosures. Absent this
recognition, A.B. 278 is unlikely to survive the express preemption of
the entire field of banking for loans originated by federal thrifts prior
to the effective date of Dodd-Frank’s preemption reforms. If the fed-
eral courts recognize that HOLA field preemption no longer exists,
A.B. 278 will survive the NBA conflict preemption analysis that cur-
rently applies to national banks and federal thrifts. As a result, Califor-
nia homeowners will be afforded the process envisioned by the
Homeowner Bill of Rights.
230. Id. at 1019 (citing Bank Activities and Operations; Real Estate Lending and Ap-
praisals, 69 Fed. Reg. 1904, 1912 & n.59 (Jan. 13, 2004)).
231. See supra Part I.B (discussing one federal preemption standard for national banks
and thrifts).
232. Tamburri, 875 F. Supp. 2d at 1019–20 (citations omitted).
